Somaliland Protectorate vs. the Northeastern State of Somalia:” A Complex Issue than Meets the Eye
The article argues that Somaliland's independence claim is rooted in colonial borders, while many northeastern Somali communities support a united federal Somalia. The author believes shared history, culture, and family ties make reconciliation preferable to separation.
5/29/20265 min read
One of the most controversial political issues in the Somali Peninsula is that of Somaliland. There are competing narratives of where Somaliland begins or ends, and who belongs to it. Clan boundaries are indisputable. Colonially created sub-identity consciousness in the Somali Peninsula is, on the other hand, contentious.
Yet, these communities are the most organically integrated and intermarried Somali clans in the Peninsula. No other Somali clans can claim the degree of intermarriage between the Dhulbahante and Haberjalo/Haber Yonis. However, politics and colonial legacy weakened the bloodlines that hitherto tightly bound them.
Former British Somaliland, the largely Issaq constituent, would like to see itself as a separate state per the unilateral declaration of secession in 1991. This community is at loggerheads with the Dhulbahante, which is adamant in opposing secession. Effectively, the hitherto unified communities of former British Somaliland are split into two camps with competing narratives — between those seeking statehood and the Northeast region, which attained a Federal member state within the Somali Federal Government as of 2025.
History Matters
Following the Berlin Conference in 1884, the Somali Peninsula was divided among major powers. Djibouti, also known as French Somaliland, was given to France, South Somalia to Italy, and, most importantly, Great Britain took chunks of the remaining territories in what became British Somaliland. Through a series of treaties, the Ogaden, the Haud, and the Reserved Area regions had been ceded to Ethiopia.
Between 1884 and 1886, Great Britain entered multiple colonial treaties with the Gadabursi, Habar Awal, Habar Yonis, Habar Jeclo, Idagale, Issa, and Warsangeri clans. Most of these treaties were signed by Major Hunter for the colonial office.
The “crown colony” of Somaliland was created. Colonial treaties in those days were used as internationally sanctioned instruments enforceable among the competing European powers. However, it had no meaning for the colonized. Securing these treaties cost the colonial powers small token gifts given to the chiefs of each clan. But it left us with insurmountable damage.
One interesting historical fact is that Great Britain did not enter a similar treaty with the Northeast clans. About three reasons are given for why this happened. The most salient reason was that there were no ports in the Northeast territory that the British were after. Also, explorers, particularly John Speke, depicted this region as a warlike and frightening place for the British. Specke’s warning that the Northeast region was a tough environment for the British was so true that it almost killed Great Britain’s colonial project in East Africa. In other words, the Northeast region was home to the great patriotic movement of the Darwish (Darvish) led by Sayyid Mohammed Abdile Hassan. This movement almost undermined the career of Winston Churchill, or cost the lives of Great Britain’s major military men, General Corfield.
Those who would like to see Somaliland as a separate state and join with the Northeast region base their narrative on the 1931 Anglo-Italian boundary demarcation. This treaty reads: “a joint Anglo–Italian boundary commission in 1929–30 had demarcated the boundary between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland from the Gulf of Aden inland to 8° N., 48° E., and then extended the demarcation along the 8th parallel to the 47th meridian.”
This map, if accepted, would extend Somaliland’s claim to the outskirts of Garowe, the administrative seat of the Puntland administration. The historic site of Taleh will also go to the side seeking a separate state.
It is here that the narratives advanced by Somaliland and the Northeast Somali region depart. Hargeisa would like to stick to this[colonially produced] boundary. Those who fought for the creation of the Northeast State and fought between 1900 and 1920 to eject Great Britain from Somaliland dismiss the colonial treaties or colonially produced borders as a pretext to break up Somalia; rather, they argue that the 1884 through 1886 tribal treaties, which established the British Somaliland Protectorate, do not apply to them.
Troubled Road to Unification
The concept of unifying Somaliland with Italian Somaliland has fluctuated. To be precise, it has been problematic. In the 1940s, the East African Issaq Association disavowed the idea of searching for a Somalia free from colonialism (See Roble, Faisal 2010). Then came leaders like Farah Omer, Abdullahi Qarshe, and Sheikh Bashir, who stood firmly for unity and turned the tide following WWII. Between 1941 and 1947, the entire Somali Peninsula (British, Italian Somaliland, the Northern Frontier District, and the Ogaden) was administered by Great Britain. By the 1950s, a wind of pan-Somali patriotism swept the land, paving the way for the unstoppable mass movement for the unification of British and Italian Somalilands. That era crystallized the vision of a unified Somalia in the Horn of Africa region.
The New York Times captured the collective euphoric spirit of that eventful night of June 26, 1960; the lone public space in Hargiesa — the Khayria (the blessed park) — served as ground zero for the retirement of the Union Jack Flag for good and the raising of the first ever Somali flag to mark the unique victory of a “nation in search of a state.” Songs of love and oneness reverberated in every corner of Hargeisa.
Tima’s Cade’s victory song of “Kana Siib Kana Saar (Bring the damned Union Jack flag and hoist instead the blessed Blue flag) told an African story of pride and hope to be found in independence. Other songs by Abdullahi Qarshi, Hussein Aw Farah, Mohamed Suleiman, Maandeq, and many others affirmed the inner feelings of millions of Somalis across the globe. That night, these men and women tested,
touched, and smelled what freedom represents to a colonized nation. Even those not in Hargiesa shared the happiness from a distance. The toll rang for those residing in the five divided Somali regions.
In the moment of love and jubilation, the call for unconditional unification seized the imagination of Somaliland leaders. Come June of 1960 and July 1st, independence and unification were achieved and memorialized in a single declaration by the brothers on both sides. Despite the pain to follow soon, the unification was unconditional, and that was what the masses wanted.
Some Somaliland elites, however, quickly became disillusioned with the unification. Before 1991 or even the 1980s, when the Somali National Movement (SNM) took up arms to address widespread political discontent in Somaliland (I.M. Lewis, 1994), there was a Hassan Kayd-led mutiny, or revolt, if you will.
The young officers’ mutiny in the North expressed their misgivings about the lack of equitable power sharing following unification. Today, the Hassan Kayd revolt is considered the precursor to the formation of the SNM and an early expression of the secession that the SNM implemented.
Some argue that the Hassan Kayd-led mutiny is nothing more than a “romanticized” event by young soldiers. A recent article on Wardheernews presents an opposing viewpoint of how Somalilanders view the Hassan Keyd factor. By referencing the works of Contini, Ghalib, and Abdi Samatar, this article by a pro-unity writer labels it a ‘romanticised secessionist project. This is clear testimony to the rigid position of each camp; the pro-unity and those seeking secession are irreconcilable.
Final Remarks
For over thirty years, Somalilanders seeking separation refused to negotiate their unilateral position taken in 1991, even though this is a legally complicated political stance.
Mogadishu has approved a new status for the North-Eastern-State (NES) and recognized it as a Federal Member State of Somalia. In layman’s terms, this new state separates the former Khatumo-Sool and parts of the Sanag region from Somaliland as we know it. In that case, the scope of Somaliland is narrowed both geographically and in the number of clans in the original Protectorate.
Somaliland’s quest for a separate state is largely governed by international politics – that of the United Nations in particular. So far, most, if not all, of the guidelines governing sovereignty vs. secession seem not to favor Hergiesa. Whether the arc of Somalia’s sovereignty would be bent to benefit Somaliland’s change of status remains to be seen. The Israeli recognition of Somaliland certainly complicates matters.
After all that is said, given the higher degree of intermarriage between the people of the two regions, the shared historical experience, and the love for the Somali language they enjoy, every effort must be undertaken to work towards reconciling these sisterly communities despite politics.
Faisal A Roble
Email: faisalroble19@gmail.com
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Faisal Roble, a former editor in Chief of Wardheernews, is writing a book on the History of state formation, conflicts, and conquest in the Horn of Africa.
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References
1. David D. Latin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of A State, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987.
2. Gerald Hanley, Warriors: Life and Death among the Somalis, England, London, 1993.
3, I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kingship in Somali Society, 1994.
4. Ismail Ali Ismail, Governance: The Source and Hope of Somalia, Canada, 2010.
5. John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, New York, 1964.